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a b s t r a c t
We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in
systems with independent selfish and non-colluding agents. The quality of a coordination
mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy—the worst-case performance of a Nash
equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum. We give upper and lower
bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish task allocation and congestion games.
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1. Introduction
The price of anarchy [25,33] measures the deterioration in performance of systems on which resources are allocated by
selfish agents. It captures the lack of coordination between independent selfish agents as opposed to the lack of information
(competitive ratio) or the lack of computational resources (approximation ratio). However, unlike the competitive and
approximation ratios, the price of anarchy failed to suggest a framework in which coordination algorithms for selfish agents
should be designed and evaluated.
In this work, we attempt to remedy the situation. We propose a framework to study some of these problems and define
the notion of coordination mechanisms (the parallel of online or approximation algorithms) which attempt to redesign the
system to reduce the price of anarchy. To introduce the issues, we consider first some situations from which the notion of
coordination mechanisms emerges in a natural way.
Consider first the selfish task allocation problem studied in [25]. There is a simple network of m parallel links or m
identical machines and a set of n selfish users. Each user i has some loadwi and wants to schedule it on one of the machines.
When the users act selfishly at a Nash equilibrium the resulting allocation may be suboptimal. The price of anarchy,
that is, the worst-case ratio of the maximum latency at a Nash equilibrium over the optimal allocation can be as high as
Θ(logm/ log logm) [25,14,26]. The question is ‘‘How can we improve the price of anarchy?’’; and what mechanisms one can
use to improve the overall systemperformance even in the face of selfish behavior?Wewill assume that the systemdesigner
can select the scheduling policies of each machine; we then ask whether some scheduling policies can reduce the price of
anarchy and by howmuch. An important aspect of the problem is that the designer must design the system once and for all,
or equivalently that the scheduling policies should be defined before the set of loads is known. Another important and natural
condition is the decentralized nature of the problem: the scheduling on a machine should depend only on the loads assigned
to it and should be independent of the loads assigned to other machines (otherwise an optimal allocation can be easily
enforced by a centralized authority and all game-theoretic issues vanish). This framework is very similar to competitive
analysis, especially if we consider the worst-case price of anarchy: We, the designers, select the scheduling policies for each
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machine. Then an adversary selects a set of loads. We then compute the makespan of the worst Nash equilibrium and divide by
the makespan of the optimal allocation. It is important to clarify that we divide with the absolute (original) optimum which
is independent of our choice of scheduling policies. We also want to clarify that in this work we assume that the number of
players is fixed. There are interesting questions when we assume that the number of players is not fixed in advance, but we
do not treat them in this work.
Our second example is based on congestion games [35,28]. To simplify the discussion let’s consider the special class of
single-commodity (that is, symmetric) congestion games in this section. In a single-commodity congestion game there are
n selfish players that want to establish a path from a fixed node s to a fixed destination t . The edges of the network have
latency (cost) functions ce so that when exactly k players use the edge e, each one of the players incurs cost ce(k). The cost
of a player is the sum of the costs of the edges that he uses. We define the social cost to be the maximum cost among the
players. The selfish behavior of the players may result in suboptimal Nash equilibria and the congestion game may have a
high price of anarchy.1 How canwe reduce it?We propose to studymechanisms that slow down the traffic on some edges to
improve the performance. More precisely, we, the designers select for each edge e a new latency function cˆe which is equal
or greater than the original latency function ce. Notice that, as in the case of the selfish task allocation, we should divide the
Nash equilibrium social cost (computed using the new latency functions cˆe) by the optimal latency (of the original latency
functions ce).
There are twomajor differences between the models of the above examples: The first difference is that in the first model
of selfish task allocation, there is an adversary who selects the weights; in the second example of congestion games, the
players have no weights and there is no place for an adversary (as we already mentioned, we assume that the number
of player is also known to the coordination mechanism). The second difference is that in the first model the coordination
mechanism can assign priorities and therefore the cost function of the facilities (machines) is player-specific; in the second
example, all players that use a facility pay the same cost (we call these coordination mechanisms symmetric).
1.1. Our contributions
To study the above and similar problems, we introduce a unifying framework: the notion of coordination models which
is an appropriate generalization of congestion games and the notion of coordination mechanisms which generalizes the
scheduling policies and the increase in the cost and latency functions of the above examples.
Using this framework, we study the selfish task allocation problem (Section 3). We give a coordination mechanism (i.e.,
scheduling policies) with price of anarchy 4/3− 1/(3m), improving significantly over the originalΘ(logm/ log logm). We
conjecture that this bound is tight.
We also study symmetric coordination mechanisms for congestion games (Section 4). We first show that any symmetric
coordinationmechanism has price of anarchy at least n. Then, we show an interesting relation between the potential and the
social cost of a set of strategies; based on these, we give a coordinationmechanismwith price of anarchy n for series-parallel
network congestion games.
1.2. Related work
Mechanisms to improve coordination of selfish agents are not a new idea and we only mention here work that directly
relates to our approach. A central topic in game theory [32] is the notion of mechanism design2 in which the players are
paid (or penalized) to ‘‘coordinate’’. Another attempt is the introduction of taxes (tolls) on the edges of the network in selfish
routing games. In both of these approaches, the objectives of the players are modified by introducing side payments to their
utilities.
In the former class of problems, part of the input is unknown to the system designer and is controlled by the selfish
players. The objective of the mechanism designer is to convince the players to reveal their true values (truthfulness) by
paying them, while simultaneously optimize (as much possible) the system objective. In the latter class of problems (see
for example [13,12,16,20,21]), the objective of the designer is to determine optimal taxes on the edges that result in an
optimal routing, assuming that the players’ objective is affected by the taxes imposed. Our approach generalizes the notion
of taxes: The tax on each edge is constant, independent of the traffic of the edge; in coordination mechanisms, the delay is
a general function of the traffic on the edge. Thus, coordination mechanisms make sense even when the global traffic rates
are not known to the mechanism. This raises the interesting question – which we do not pursue in this work – for designing
mechanisms that work for any rates or any number of players; clearly constant taxes are very limited, if we do not know
the total amount of traffic.
In our setting, we modify the objective of the players by adding delays and setting priorities on each edge. We do
not make use of side payments. We also do not assume knowledge of the exact instance; we assume knowledge of the
network topology but we do not know the weight of the players that participate. Also, the algorithmic and communication
1 See [4,10,9,1] for results on price of anarchy of congestion games for linear and polynomial latency functions. In thiswork,we consider general latencies.
2 See [31] for an introduction to the algorithmic aspects of this notion.
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issues involved in mechanism design seem to be completely different than the ones involved in coordination mechanisms
[31,30,34,3].
The idea of designing games to improve coordination appears also in the work of Korilis, Lazar, and Orda [24] but there
the goal is to design games with a unique Nash equilibrium; there is no attempt to compare it with the potential optimum.
Also, [29] analyzes how much total money one has to spend in order to influence the outcome of the game, when the
interested party gives payments to agents on certain outcomes.
A problem that relates to coordination mechanisms for selfish routing, and studied in [36], asks to find a subnetwork of a
given network that has optimal price of anarchy for a given total flow. This can be also cast as a special case of coordination
mechanisms that allow either a given specific delay function or infinity (and fixed total flow).
Following the conference version of this work [11] a few publications studied coordination mechanisms. In particular,
[19,22] study coordinationmechanisms for the selfish task allocation, while [2,8] consider truthfulmechanisms for the same
problem. Recently, Azar et al. [5] and Caragiannis [6] consider coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling on unrelated
machines. Also, Kollias [22] gave lower bounds for coordination mechanisms for the selfish task allocation problem when
no delays are allowed.
2. The model
Congestion games [35,28,15], introduced by Rosenthal, is an important class of games that capturemany aspects of selfish
behavior in networks. A congestion game is defined by a tuple (N,M, (Σi)i∈N , (c j)j∈M)where N is the set of players,M is the
set of facilities, Σi is a collection of strategies for player i, and c j is the cost (delay) function of facility j. The characterizing
property of congestion games is that the cost of players for using facility j is the same for all players and depends only on
the number of players using the facility: when k players use facility j, the cost of each player for using the facility is c j(k).
The cost of each player is the sum of the individual cost of each facility used by the player.
There are three important classes of congestion games: the single-commodity or symmetric, the multi-commodity, and
the general congestion games. In themost restricted class, the single-commodity congestion game, there are n selfish players
that want to establish a path from a fixed node s to a fixed destination t . The facilities are the edges of the network and the
strategies for each player are the paths from s to t . In the more general class of multi-commodity games, each player may
have its own source and destination. Finally, in the most general class there is no network. It is well-known that every
congestion game has at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
To define the price of anarchy of a congestion game, we need first to agree on the social cost (i.e., the system cost) of a set
of strategies. Two natural choices are themaximum or the average cost per player —the first one was used in the selfish task
allocation problem of [25] and corresponds to the makespan, and the second one was used in the selfish routing problem
in [37]. The price of anarchy is then defined as the worst-case ratio, among all Nash equilibria, over the optimal social cost,
among all possible set of strategies.
One can generalize congestion games in two directions: First, to allow the players to have loads or weights and second,
to allow asymmetric cost functions where players experience different cost for using a facility [27,17]. These generalizations
are realized by cost functions c ji , one for each player —the cost of player i for using facility j is now c
j
i (w
j) where wj is the
sum of weights of the players using facility j.
Howcanwe improve theprice of anarchy of congestion games [4,10,9,1]? There are two simpleways: First, by introducing
delays, and second, by distinguishing between players and assigning priorities to them. Given a generalized congestion game
(N,M, (Σi)i∈N , (c ji )j∈M,i∈N), we shall define the set of all possible games that result when we add delays and priorities; we
will call these games coordinationmechanisms. The introduction of delays is straightforward: the set of allowed games have
cost functions cˆ ji where cˆ
j
i (w) ≥ c ji (w).Wewill call these symmetric coordinationmechanisms. Theway to introduce priorities
is less obvious but we can approach the problem as follows: Let facility j assign priorities to players so that it services first
player t1, then player t2 and so on. The cost (delay) of the first player t1 cannot be less than c
j
t1(wt1), the cost of using the
facility itself. Similarly, the cost of the k-th player tk cannot be less than c
j
tk(wt1 + · · · + wtk).
The natural problem is to select a coordination mechanism with small price of anarchy among all those coordination
mechanisms with delays and priorities. To define this problem precisely and generalize the above discussion, we introduce
the notion of coordination model in the next subsection.
2.1. Coordination models
A CoordinationModel is a tuple (N,M, (Σi)i∈N , (C j)j∈M)where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players,M is a set of facilities,
Σi is a collection of strategies for player i: a strategy Ai ∈ Σi is a set of facilities, and finally C j is a collection of cost functions
associated with facility j: a cost function c j ∈ C j is a function that takes as input n loads, one for each player, and outputs a
cost to each player. More precisely, c j is a cost function from RN to RN . When a player does not use the facility, his load is 0
and we must have c ji (w1, . . . , wi−1, 0, wi+1, . . . , wn) = 0, which expresses exactly the property that players incur no cost
when they do not use the facility.
A symmetric coordination mechanism is one in which the cost functions are the same for all players who use it and
depend only on the sum of their weights: c ji (w) = c j(
∑m
i=1wi).
3330 G. Christodoulou et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 3327–3336
In most coordination models, the strategies and cost functions are defined implicitly; for example, by introducing delays
and priorities to a given congestion game. We remark however that the congestion model corresponds to a particular game
– there is only one cost function for each facility – while in our model there is a collection of games—a set of cost functions
for each facility.
Example. The coordination model for selfish task allocation that corresponds to the problem studied in [25] is as follows:
N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, M = {1, . . . ,m} the set of facilities is a set of machines or links, all Σi’s consists of all
singleton subsets ofM ,Σi = {{1}, . . . , {m}}, i.e., each player uses exactly one facility, and the cost functions are the possible
finish times for scheduling the loads on a facility. More precisely, a function c j is a cost function for facility j if for every set of
loads (w1, . . . , wn) and every subset S of N , the maximum finish time of the players in S must be at least equal to the total
length of the loads in S: maxi∈S c ji (w1, . . . , wn) ≥
∑
i∈S wi. Notice that a facility is allowed to order the loads arbitrarily and
introduce delays, but it cannot speed up the execution. As an example, a facility could schedule two loadsw1 andw2 so that
the first load finishes at timew1 + w2/2 and the second load at time 2w1 + w2.
Example. We can extend a congestion model to a symmetric coordination model in a natural way, by allowing each facility
to introduce delays. Consider a givenweighted congestion gameG inwhich the cost dj(k) of facility j depends on the sum k of
weights of the players using the facility. A symmetric coordination model contains all games with cost functions greater or
equal to the cost functions of G for every edge j: Wewill call this model the symmetric coordinationmodel for congestion
games. Here we will study only the unweighted case where the players have always weightwi = 1.
2.2. Coordination mechanisms
The notion of coordination model defined in the previous subsection sets the stage for an adversarial analysis of the
deterioration in performance due to lack of coordination. The situation is best understood when we compare it with
competitive analysis. The following table shows the correspondence.
Coordination model ↔ Online problem
Coordination mechanism ↔ Online algorithm
Price of anarchy ↔ Competitive ratio.
It should be apparent from this correspondence that one cannot expect to obtain meaningful results for every possible
coordinationmodel in the sameway thatwedonot expect to be able to find a unifying analysis of every possible online problem.
Each particular coordination model that arises in ‘‘practice’’ or in ‘‘theory’’ should be analyzed alone. We now proceed to
define the notion of coordination mechanism and its price of anarchy.
A coordination mechanism for a coordination model (N,M, (Σi)i∈N , (c j)j∈M) is simply a set of cost functions, one for each
facility. The simplicity of this definition may be misleading unless we take into account that the set of cost functions may
be very rich. A coordination mechanism is essentially a decentralized algorithm; we select once and for all the cost functions
for each facility, before the input is known.
For example, for the coordination model for selfish task allocation, a coordination mechanism is essentially a set of local
scheduling policies, one for each facility; the scheduling on each facility depends only on the loads that use the facility. Observe
that a facility knows the entire vector (w1, . . . , wn), where wi is either the load of player i when he uses the facility, or 0
when he does not use it. Specifically, a facility knows the total number of players n and the loads and IDs of those players
who use it. A facility does not know the loads and strategies of those players who do not use it.
For the coordination model for congestion games the situation is simpler: a facility knows all parameters of the original
congestion game G and it has to select a cost function greater or equal than the original one (for every number of players).
Fix a coordination mechanism c = (c1, . . . , cm), a set of player loads w = (w1, . . . , wn), and a set of strategies
A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Σ1 × · · · × Σn. Let (cost1, . . . , costn) denote the cost incurred by the players. We define the social
cost sc(w; c; A) as the maximum cost among the players, i.e., sc(w; c; A) = maxi∈N costi.
We also define the social optimum opt(w) for a given set of player loadsw as the minimum social cost of all coordination
mechanisms and all strategies inΣ1 × · · · ×Σn, i.e.,
opt(w) = inf
c,A
sc(w; c; A). (1)
It is important to notice that the definition of opt(w) refers to the absolute optimum which is independent of the
coordination mechanism. For example, for the coordination model of the selfish task allocation, a coordination mechanism
is allowed to slow down the facilities, but the optimum opt(w) is computed using the original speeds.
To a coordination mechanism c and set of player loadsw corresponds a game; the cost of a player is the sum of the cost of
all facilities used by the player. LetNe(w; c) be the set of (mixed) Nash equilibria of this game.We define the price of anarchy
(or coordination ratio) of a coordination mechanism c as the maximum over all set of loads w and all Nash equilibria E of
the social cost over the social optimum.
PA(c) = sup
w
sup
E∈Ne(w;c)
sc(w; c; E)
opt(w)
.
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We define the price of anarchy of a coordination model as the minimum price of anarchy over all its coordination
mechanisms.
The situation is very similar to the framework of competitive analysis in online algorithms or the analysis of
approximation algorithms. Online algorithms address the lack of information by striving to reduce the competitive ratio;
approximation algorithms address the lack of sufficient computational resources by striving to reduce the approximation
ratio. In a similar way, coordination mechanisms address the lack of coordination due to selfish behavior by striving to
reduce the price of anarchy.
The analogy also helps to clarify onemore issue:Why do we need to minimize the price of anarchy and not simply the cost of
the worst-case Nash equilibrium? In the sameway that it is not in general possible to have an online algorithm thatminimizes
the cost for every input, it is not in general possible to have a mechanism that minimizes the cost of the worst-case Nash
equilibrium for every possible game of the coordination model.
3. Selfish task allocation
We now turn our attention to the coordination model for selfish task allocation. There are n players with loads and m
identical facilities (machines or links). The objective of eachplayer is tominimizeher finishing time. Themechanismdesigner
has to select and announce a scheduling policy on each facility once and for all (without the knowledge of the loads). The
scheduling policy on each facility must depend only on its own loads (and not on loads allocated to the other machines).
Let’s first consider the case of m = 2 facilities. In retrospect, the coordination mechanism considered in [25] schedules
the loads on each link in a random order resulting in the price of anarchy of 3/2. Consider now the following mechanism:
Increasing–Decreasing: ‘‘The loads are ordered by size. If two ormore loads have the same size, their order is the lexicographic
order of the associated players. Then the first facility schedules its loads in order of increasing size while the second facility
schedules its loads in order of decreasing size’’.
This mechanism aims to break the symmetry of loads. It is easy to see that the agent with theminimum load goes always
to the first link. Similarly, the agent with the maximum load goes to the second link.
Proposition 1. The above increasing–decreasing coordination mechanism has price of anarchy 1 for n ≤ 3 and at least 4/3 for
n ≥ 4.
Proof. First, consider 3 jobs with weightsw1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3. Clearly, in the optimum allocation the first job is executed alone
in a separate machine, while the other two jobs are executed together. Notice that in the Nash equilibrium, the first job
will be executed first in the ‘‘decreasing’’ machine, so this is a dominant strategy for this job. The third job will analogously
choose the ‘‘increasing’’ machine, while the second job will choose the ‘‘increasing’’ machine, because it will cost her time
w3 + w2 which is less comparing to the time w1 + w2 that she would need in the ‘‘decreasing’’ machine. Hence the only
Nash equilibrium of this game coincides with the optimum.
For the lower bound for n ≥ 4, considerw1 = 2+,w2 = 2, w3 = 1−,w4 = 1, for arbitrarily small . In the only Nash
equilibrium of this instance, the ‘‘decreasing’’ machine will get the first job, while the rest go to the ‘‘increasing’’ machine,
giving a makespan of 4− . In the optimum allocation the first and the third jobs go together giving a makespan of 3. 
Is there a better coordination mechanism for 2 or more facilities? To motivate the better coordination mechanism
consider the case of n = m players each with load 1. Symmetric coordination mechanisms in which all facilities have
the same scheduling policy have very large price of anarchy: The reason is that there is a Nash equilibrium in which each
player selects randomly (uniformly) among the facilities; this is similar to the classical bins-and-balls random experiment,
and the price of anarchy is the expected maximum:Θ(logm/ log logm).
It is clear that the large price of anarchy results when players ‘‘collide’’. Intuitively this can be largely avoided in pure
equilibria. To make this more precise consider the case where all loads have distinct sizes and furthermore all partial sums
are also distinct. Consider now the coordination mechanism for m machines where every machine schedules the jobs in
decreasing order; furthermore to break the ‘‘symmetry’’ assume that machine j introduces a delay j for each job and for
some small  > 0. Then in the only Nash equilibrium the largest job goes to the first machine, the next job goes to second
machine and so on; the next job in decreasing size goes to themachinewith theminimum load. There is a small complication
if the delays j create some tie, but we can select small enough  so that this never happens.
It should be clear that this is a mechanism with small price of anarchy. But what happens if the jobs are not distinct or
the delays j create ties? We can avoid both problems with a coordination mechanism based on two properties:
• Each facility schedules the loads in decreasing order (using the lexicographic order to break any potential ties).
• For each player, the cost on the facilities are different. That is, when we fix the weights and strategies of the remaining
players, there is a unique optimal machine for the player.
To achieve the second property, the cost c ji (w1, . . . , wn) is a numberwhose representation in the (m+1)-ary system ends in
j. The facility may have to introduce a small delay (at most a multiplicative factor of δ, for some fixed small δ). In particular,
suppose that a job is to finish at time t inmachine j. Then themachinewill release it at some time t ′ in the interval [t, (1+δ)t],
where the representation of t ′ in the (m+1)-ary systemends in j. Since there are infinitelymany choices of t ′, themechanism
must select one, for example, the choicewith the shortest representation in the (m+1)-ary system. As an example, consider
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Fig. 1. Unbounded price of anarchy.
m = 9 machines and δ = 0.01. If a job is to finish at time t = 1.362 in machine j = 8, then it will be released at some time
in the interval [1.362, (1+ δ) · 1.362] = [1.362, 1.37562] and the release timemust end in 8 in the (conveniently selected)
decimal system. There are many choices for t ′; the one with the shortest representation is 1.368.
Theorem 1. The above coordination mechanism for n players and m facilities has price of anarchy 4/3− 1/(3m).
Proof. There is only one Nash equilibrium: The largest load is ‘‘scheduled’’ first on every facility independently of the
remaining loads, but there is a unique facility for which the players’ cost is minimum. Similarly for the second largest load
there is a unique facility with minimum cost independently of the smaller loads. In turn this is true for each load. Notice
however that this is exactly the greedy scheduling with the loads ordered in decreasing size (aka LPT scheduling). It has been
analyzed in Graham’s seminal work [18] where it was established that its approximation ratio is 4/3− 1/(3m). Given that
the total delay introduced by the δ terms increases the social cost by at most δ, we conclude that the price of anarchy is at
most 4/3− 1/(3m)+ δ. The infimum as δ tends to 0 is 4/3− 1/(3m).
To see that this bound is tight we reproduce Graham’s lower bound: Three players have load m and for each k =
m + 1, . . . , 2m − 1, two players have load k. The social optimal is 3m but the coordination mechanism has social cost
4m− 1 (plus some δ term). 
Notice some additional nice properties of this coordination mechanism: there is a unique Nash equilibrium (thus it is
easy for players to ‘‘agree’’) and it has low computational complexity. In contrast, computing Nash equilibria is potentially
a hard problem [7].
The above theorem shows that good coordination mechanisms reduce the price of anarchy fromΘ(logm/ log logm) to
a small constant. Is there a coordination mechanism with better price of anarchy than 4/3− 1/3m?We conjecture that the
answer is negative (see [22] for a partial answer, which shows that delays are indispensable).
Finally we observe that the above mechanism reduces the question about the price of anarchy to the question of the
approximation ratio of the LPT algorithm. This naturally extends to the case of machines with speeds. In this case, the best
known lower and upper bounds for the LPT algorithm are 1.54 and 1 + √3/3, due to Kovács [23]. Therefore we get the
following:
Theorem 2. The above coordination mechanism for n players and m facilities with different speeds has price of anarchy between
1.54 and 1+√3/3.
4. Congestion games
In the previous section, we discussed coordination mechanisms for linear delay functions. In this section we will
discuss symmetric coordination mechanisms for arbitrary delay functions. A symmetric coordination mechanism for an
(unweighted) congestion game G is simply a congestion game with cost functions greater or equal to the cost functions of
G. We will also consider pure Nash equilibria—congestion games and therefore their coordinationmechanisms have at least
one pure Nash equilibrium.
Unlike the model of the previous section, now there are no weights to be selected by an adversary. The analysis here is
not analogous with competitive analysis.
Consider the single-commodity congestion game with n = 2 players defined by the network of the Fig. 1, where the
labels on the edges represent facility/edge costs: (ce(1), . . . , ce(n)). For a  b  1, there is a Nash equilibrium where
player 1 selects path ABCD and player 2 selects path ACBD; its social cost is 2 + b. The optimal solution is (ABD, ACD) with
cost 2. Hence the price of anarchy is (2+ b)/2 which can be arbitrarily high. Therefore
Proposition 2. Without a coordination mechanism, the price of anarchy of congestion games (even of single-commodity ones) is
unbounded.
Can coordination mechanisms reduce the price of anarchy for congestion games ?We believe that the answer is positive
for single-commodity congestion games with monotone3 facility costs, i.e., when c j(k) ≤ c j(k + 1) for all j and k. But we
were able to establish it only for the special class of congestion games with series-parallel graphs.
Definition 1. A congestion game is a series-parallel congestion game, if it is a single-commodity network congestion game
with common source a vertex s and common destination a vertex t , and its underlying network is an s–t series parallel
graph.
3 For the unnatural case of non-monotone facility costs, it can be easily shown that no coordination mechanism has bounded price of anarchy.
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Fig. 2. Price of anarchy n.
4.1. Series-parallel congestion games
We first establish the lower bound.
Theorem 3. There are congestion games (even series-parallel ones) for which no symmetric coordination mechanism has price
of anarchy less than the number of players, n.
Proof. Consider a network with nodes v0, v1, . . . , vn and n pairs of parallel edges (vi, vi+1), the upper edge with costs
(0, . . . , 0, a) and the lower edge with costs (a, . . . , a) for some large constant a; Fig. 2 depicts the network for 3 players. An
optimal set of strategies is for player i to select the upper edges with the single exception that between vi−1 and vi where
it selects the lower edge; its social cost is a. On the other hand, a Nash equilibrium occurs when all players select the upper
edges only. Its social cost is n ·a and its price of anarchy n. No symmetric coordinationmechanism can improve this: Clearly,
at stage i from node vi−1 to node vi, at least one player will incur cost at least a. Since the stages are independent, there is
a Nash equilibrium in which the same player incurs cost at least a in every stage. This Nash equilibrium has social cost at
least n · a and its price of anarchy is at least n. 
We will now show that this lower bound is tight.
Theorem 4. For every series-parallel congestion game there is a coordination mechanism with price of anarchy at most n.
Theproof uses thenotion of potential [35,28] of a set of strategies/paths due toRosenthal. To define it, letA = (A1, . . . , An)
be strategies for the n players and let ne = ne(A) denote the number of occurrences of edge e in the paths A1, . . . , An. The
potential P(A) is defined in [35] as
∑
e
∑ne
k=1 ce(k) and plays a central role: The set of strategies A is a Nash equilibrium if
and only if P(A) is a local minimum (i.e., when we change the strategy of only one player, the potential can only increase).
It is also useful to bound the social cost as suggested by the following lemma
Lemma 1. For every strategy A: sc(A) ≤ P(A) ≤ n · sc(A).
Proof. The lemma follows from the definitions of P(A) =∑e∑nek=1 ce(k) and sc(A) = maxi ci. The left inequality is derived
as:
sc(A) = max
i
ci = max
i
∑
e∈Ai
ce(ne) ≤
∑
e
ce(ne) ≤
∑
e
ne∑
k=1
ce(k) = P(A),
and the right one as:
P(A) =
∑
e
ne∑
k=1
ce(k) ≤
∑
e
nece(ne) =
∑
i
ci ≤ nmax
i
ci = nsc(A). 
The idea of a coordinationmechanism for Theorem 4 is simple: Let A∗ = (A∗1, . . . , A∗n) be a set of strategies that minimize
the social cost (and achieve the social optimal). Let ne(A∗) be the number of occurrences of edge e in the paths A∗1, . . . , A∗n .
The coordination mechanism keeps the same cost ce(k) for k ≤ ne(A∗), but changes the cost ce(k) for k > ne(A∗) to some
sufficiently large constant a 1:
cˆe(k) =

ce(k) k ≤ ne(A∗)
a ·m for every kwhen ne(A∗) = 0
a otherwise.
The last two cases assign very high cost to edges that are used beyond the capacity determined by the optimal solution A∗.
The middle case assigns even higher cost to edges not used at all by A∗ to guarantee that they are not used by any Nash
equilibrium: the cost of one such edge exceeds the sum of cost of all – less thanm – edges used by the optimal solution.
The idea of the mechanism is that the high cost awill discourage players to use each edge emore than ne(A∗) times and
therefore will end up at a set of strategies A with the same occurrences of edges as in A∗. This in turn would imply that
A and A∗ have the same potential and the theorem will follow from Lemma 1. However natural this idea for coordination
mechanism may be, it is not guaranteed to work —there may exist Nash equilibria that use some edges more than A∗ (with
cost a) but each individual player cannot switch to a path consisting entirely of low cost edges.
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We have an example for single-commodity network congestion games where this happens (Section 4.2), but the
following graph-theoretic lemma shows that this cannot happen for games of series-parallel graphs4:
Lemma 2. In a series-parallel multi-graph consider n s− t edge-disjoint paths A∗1, . . . , A∗n and let A1, . . . , Ak be any other s− t
paths with k < n. Then there is an s− t path with edges that appear in A∗1, . . . , A∗n but not in A1, . . . , Ak.
Proof. We will prove this by induction on the structure of the graph. The basis of the induction (with a graph of only one
edge) is trivial (we must have n = 1 and k = 0).
For the induction step, if the last composition of the graph is a series composition, we get the desired path by simply
applying the series composition to the paths of the two parts.
If the last composition is a parallel composition, let n1, k1 and n2, k2 be the number of paths in the two parts (with
n = n1+ n2 and k = k1+ k2). Since n > k, we must have n1 > k1 or n2 > k2. By induction, there is a path in the component
iwhere the inequality ni > ki is true. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider a series-parallel (directed) graph and an optimal set of strategiesA∗ = (A∗1, . . . , A∗n). Consider
also a Nash equilibrium A = (A1, . . . , An) for the above-defined coordination mechanism cˆ.
We will show that for every edge e, its multiplicity ne(A) in the paths of A does not exceed its multiplicity ne(A∗) in the
paths of A∗, i.e. ne(A) ≤ ne(A∗).
First of all, the paths in A use only edges that appear in A∗, otherwise some player would benefit by switching to any path
of A∗ (this is guaranteed by the cost a ·m assigned by the mechanism).
Fix now a player i and consider the paths A−i of the remaining players. There is a path whose edges multiplicity ne(A−i) is
at most ne(A∗)− 1, as it follows directly from Lemma 2 for the paths A∗ and A−i. This path constitutes a strategy for player i
which is less expensive than any path that uses some edge ewithmultiplicitymore than ne(A∗). SinceA is a Nash equilibrium,
it follows that player i uses only edges with multiplicity at most ne(A∗). Of course, the same is true for all players.
In conclusion, the potential P(A) is no greater than the potential P(A∗) and the theorem follows from Lemma 1. 
Another interesting fact that follows easily from similar considerations is that
Theorem 5. The above coordination mechanism cˆ has price of anarchy at most d for series-parallel congestion games with
maximum s–t distance d.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4, let A, A∗ be a Nash equilibrium and an optimal set of strategies; it was shown there that
for every edge e, ne(A) ≤ ne(A∗). Let us assume that in A the player with maximum cost is i. We then have:
sc(A)= ci(A)
= ∑
e∈Ai
cˆe(ne(A))
≤ |Ai| ·max
e
cˆe(ne(A))
≤ |Ai| ·max
e
cˆe(ne(A∗)) because ne(A) ≤ ne(A∗) for every e
= |Ai| ·max
e
ce(ne(A∗)) by the definition of cˆ
≤ |Ai| · sc(A∗)
≤ d · sc(A∗). 
4.2. Counterexample of single-commodity network congestion game
The algorithm of Theorem 4, does not hold for single-commodity network congestion games. In this section we give a
counterexample where the algorithm fails to provide a bounded Price of Anarchy.
Assume that we have the single-commodity instance of Fig. 3 where 4 players want to route their traffic from s to t .
An optimum profile has cost 11 and selects the paths as follows:
A∗1 = (s, a, e, g, h, k, l, t)
A∗2 = (s, b, e, g, j, t)
A∗3 = (s, c, d, f , e, g, i, t)
A∗4 = (s, c, d, f , h, k, l, t).
If we apply the symmetric coordination mechanism of Theorem 4 to this instance, the cost function of edge (e, g) will
increase to (1, 1, 1,M ′), while the cost function of (f , h) will increase to (1,M ′,M ′,M ′), where M ′  M . Furthermore, it
will change all occurences ofM toM ′.
4 In the conference version of the paper, we erroneously claimed that the mechanism has approximation n for single-commodity games.
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Fig. 3. Unbounded price of anarchy.
Now consider the following paths:
A1 = (s, a, e, g, h, k, l, t)
A2 = (s, b, e, g, h, k, l, t)
A3 = (s, c, d, f , e, g, i, t)
A4 = (s, c, d, f , e, g, j, t).
The above paths form a Nash equilibrium with social cost 9 + 2M ′, and therefore the price of anarchy of the
aforementioned mechanism can be arbitrarily high.
5. Open problems
The immediate problem left open by our results is to close the gap between the upper and the lower bound for the task
allocation problem. Also in Section 4.1, we considered only congestion games with no weights (and no adversary). What is
the price of anarchywhen the players haveweightswi or simplywhen an adversary can select which playerswill participate
(this corresponds to 0–1 weights)? A more distributed mechanism is required in this case.
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